Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement (International Crisis Group)

In een vernietigend rapport beschrijft de gerenommeerde onafhankelijke denktank International Crisis Group (ICG) wat er allemaal mis is in Afghanistan. Het hele rapport is verplichte lectuur voor iedereen die iets te maken heeft met de besluitvorming bij het evt. zenden van een nieuwe Nederlandse ‘politietrainers’-missie naar Afghanistan.

(Ik zeg: niet doen!)

Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement (International Crisis Group)

OVERVIEW

U.S. military operations in Afghanistan are now entering their tenth year and policymakers in Washington are looking for a way out. A policy review is due in December but the outline is already clear: U.S. forces will try to pummel the Taliban to bring them to the table, responsibility for security will increasingly be transferred to Afghan forces and more money will be provided for economic development.

NATO partners agreed at the Lisbon summit to a gradual withdrawal of combat troops with the goal of transitioning to full Afghan control of security by the end of 2014. The aim will be a dignified drawdown of troops as public support wanes while at the same time ensuring that a post-withdrawal Afghanistan, at the very least, does not become the epicentre of transnational terrorism. While success is being measured in numbers of insurgents killed or captured, there is little proof that the operations have  disrupted the insurgency’s momentum or increased stability. The storyline does not match facts on the ground.

The U.S. military is already touting successes in the area around Kandahar, the focus of the most recent fighting by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). President Hamid Karzai has established a “high peace council” to manage negotiations with the insurgents and greater efforts are planned for training the Afghan army and police. The U.S. and ISAF are only months away from declaring scores of districts safe for transition. An alluring narrative of a successful counter-insurgency campaign has begun to take shape.

As violence has increased, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have proven a poor match for the Taliban. Casualties among Afghan and ISAF forces have spiked, as have civilian casualties. Afghanistan still lacks a cohesive national security strategy and the Afghan military and police remain dangerously fragmented and highly politicised. On the other side, despite heavy losses in the field, insurgent groups are finding new recruits in Pakistan’s borderlands, stretching from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to Balochistan, and using the region to regroup, reorganise and rearm, with the support and active involvement of al-Qaeda, Pakistani jihadi groups and the Pakistan military. This strategic advantage has allowed the insurgency to proliferate in nearly every corner of the country. Contrary to U.S. rhetoric of the momentum shifting, dozens of districts are now firmly under Taliban control.

Nearly a decade after the U.S. engagement began, Afghanistan operates as a complex system of multi-layered fiefdoms in which insurgents control parallel justice and security organs in many if not most rural areas, while Kabul’s kleptocratic elites control the engines of graft and international contracts countrywide. The inflow of billions in international funds has cemented the linkages between corrupt members of the Afghan government and violent local commanders – insurgent and criminal, alike. Economic growth has been tainted by the explosion of this black market, making it nearly impossible to separate signs of success and stability from harbingers of imminent collapse. The neglect of governance, an anaemic legal system and weak rule of law lie at the root of these problems. Too little effort has been made to develop political institutions, local government and a functioning judiciary. Insurgents and criminal elements within the political elite have as a result been allowed to fill the vacuum left by the weak Afghan state.

Successive U.S. administrations deserve much of the blame for this state of affairs. From the start the policy was untenable; selecting some of the most violent and corrupt people in the country, stoking them up with suitcases of cash and promises of more to come and then putting them in charge was never a recipe for stability, never mind institution building.

The leadership in Washington has consistently failed to develop and implement a coherent policy. The shift of resources and attention from Afghanistan to Iraq almost immediately after the Taliban were first driven from Kabul also underscored a lack of strategic priority. The absence of policy coherence between Washington and its NATO allies early on was replicated by sharp divisions between civilian and military leaders – as reflected in the starkly opposed opinions of the Pentagon and the U.S. embassy in Kabul on the best way forward; most recently evidenced in the departure of General Stanley McChrystal. Measuring inputs rather than outcomes has allowed bureaucrats to trumpet illusory successes. Policymaking has been haphazard, based on the premise that if a bad idea is revived often enough, it might eventually work. Plans for reintegrating the Taliban and establishing local police militias have come and gone and come again with no positive results. Attempts at reconciliation have resulted, likewise, in little more than talk about talks.

Real work to build a capable police and military only began in 2008. Despite endless pledges to restore the rule of law, efforts to provide Afghans with rudimentary justice have barely started. The international community has repeatedly failed to acknowledge the link between stability and justice, though it has long been evident that grievances against predatory government actors are driving the insurgency.

All of these problems have led many to believe it is time for the foreign forces to leave. Unfortunately, a rush to the exit will not help Afghans nor will it address the very real regional and global security concerns posed by the breakdown of the Afghan state. Without outside support, the Karzai government would collapse, the Taliban would control much of the country and internal conflict would worsen, increasing the prospects of a return of the destructive civil war of the 1990s. Even a partial Taliban victory would provide succour and a refuge for Pakistani jihadi groups. That could intensify violence in Pakistan and increase attacks on India. Afghanistan’s neighbours would step up support for their proxies, injecting military resources, financing and new energy into the war. As conflict spreads – along with refugees, jihadis and other problems – the situation would be well beyond the control of a few drone strikes.

This paper is aimed at reminding policymakers of the deep problems that exist in Afghanistan. Any plan that fails to deal with the decay in Kabul will not succeed. President Hamid Karzai no longer enjoys the legitimacy and popularity he once had and he has subsequently lost his ability to stitch together lasting political deals. Despite the rhetoric surrounding reconciliation, Karzai is in no position to act alone as a guarantor for the interests of the Afghan state. In the current political context, negotiations with the insurgents stand a slim chance of success. Instead, the key to fighting the insurgency and bringing about the conditions for a political settlement lies in improving security, justice and governance and, as previous Crisis Group reports have shown, there are few quick fixes in these areas.

 

Kabul/Brussels, 28 November 2010

Afghanistan: The Exit

22 November 2010: Responsibility for security will transfer to the Afghans in 2014 according to the recent NATO summit. Crisis Group’s Senior Afghanistan Analyst Candace Rondeaux discusses the implications of that decision and what it means for both Afghan and US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Uit: Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement (Full Report)

 

1. ANP (Afghanistan National Police)


Created, financed and overseen by the U.S. and its NATO allies, the ANP is corrupt, brutal and predatory. Although police reform is receiving more attention and resources than ever before, such increased resources are still to be matched by significant improvements in police effective- ness and public confidence.25


The poorly and hastily trained rank and file are largely illiterate, many are drug addicts, while officers, many appointed and promoted on political rather than professional grounds, are known more for their abuse of power, particularly at the local level.


Despite pay increases, attrition rates remain high as the poorly armed and poorly trained police is used more as an auxiliary security force than an enforcer of law. Resorting to bribery, illegal tax collection, drug dealing and even murder, the ANP is feared and mistrusted by Afghan citi- zens, not only undermining the legitimacy of the state but also that of the international community, particularly the U.S., responsible for bankrolling and training it.


The Obama administration appears more focused on rapidly increasing the numbers of police personnel, than in ensuring quality.26 Lt. General Caldwell, now responsible for ANSF training, admits that the Taliban are the main beneficiary of the police’s poor performance.27


Yet, in- stead of focusing on efforts to reform this dysfunctional force, the U.S. has once again resorted to a shortcut, build- ing a 10,000-strong Afghan local police force also known as the ALP, supposedly hired from local communities and trained and paid by the government.28 Vetting standards for ALP recruits29 have not been publicly established and the criteria for disbanding a local police unit that becomes abusive remain unclear.


No clear path has been defined from U.S. Special Operations control of these forces to their reintegration into regular uniformed police units. Not only are these village militias likely to be controlled by warlords, favouring some among the many competing communities and groups in a heavily armed country will result in more violence.

 

 

Uit:

Afghan Options (Paul Rogers/Oxford Research Group, June 2010)

Prospects

The official NATO line is that there may be substantial problems but that Afghanistan is more or less on track for a steady move towards stability over the next two years, leading to a progressive troop withdrawal. Many other assessments point to a very different picture of a coalition that is increasingly mired in an intractable insurgency. Much of what will happen will revolve around the experience in and around Kandahar, and the former US commander in the region, General Stanley McChrystal, made it clear that the operation may not be over by the end of the year, even though the bottom line for the Obama administration is to see evidence of substantial progress by then.

Since such progress now seems unlikely, the administration will have to decide early next year to begin a withdrawal from Afghanistan, even if that leaves Taliban elements with the prospect of a considerable role in governance. This is an outcome that would be well received in Islamabad, if not in New Delhi, and it would be of real concern in Washington, even if domestic realities forced acceptance of the unacceptable.

In all of this, though, one other factor is likely to intervene. This is the recent report of the discovery of very large mineral reserves in many part of Afghanistan. It was already noted for copper reserves, with China developing the Aynak mine in Logar Province, but other reserves include iron, cobalt, gold and lithium, the latter being a critically important metal because of its role in batteries. The reserves are reported to be worth many hundreds of billions of dollars and while development would be spread over decades, they make the country strategically important and likely to be of great interest to the United States as much as China. News of these reserves was released from the Pentagon and may reflect the need of the US military to prop up domestic support for the war.

This certainly presents the Obama administration with a singular dilemma. If it does plan to start a substantial military withdrawal next year, whatever the state of the war, it may be criticised for giving up on a country that may be of huge significance in the coming decades, just as rivalry with the new industrial giant of China comes to the fore. It is an unexpected and difficult situation facing a President who is still struggling to escape from the toxic legacy of the Bush administration. It is currently made worse by the sacking of General McChrystal, but that will be largely forgotten in a few weeks, whereas the wider predicament will still be with us in months if not years to come.

 

‘Afghanistan’ op deze blogsite

Is America on the path to ‘permanent war’? (By John Blake, CNN)

CNN — When the president decided to send more troops to a distant country during an unpopular war, one powerful senator had enough.

He warned that the U.S. military could not create stability in a country "where there is chaos … democracy where there is no tradition of it, and honest government where corruption is almost a way of life."

"It’s unnatural and unhealthy for a nation to be engaged in global crusades for some principle or idea while neglecting the needs of its own people," said Sen. J. William Fulbright, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 1966 as the Vietnam War escalated.

Fulbright’s warning is being applied by some to Afghanistan today. The U.S. is still fighting dubious wars abroad while ignoring needs at home, says Andrew J. Bacevich, who tells Fulbright’s story in his new book, "Washington Rules: America’s Path To Permanent War."

As the Afghanistan war enters its ninth year, Bacevich and other commentators are asking: When does it end? They say the nation’s national security leaders have put the U.S. on an unsustainable path to perpetual war and that President Obama is doing little to stop them…

 


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