Loopt de Amerikaanse pacificatie strategie in Afghanistan stuk?

De Amerikaanse pacificatie strategie in Afghanistan zal niet slagen volgens Franklin C. Spinney. Er zijn te weinig bondgenootschappelijke troepen om zowel veroverde gebieden te behouden als verdere offensieve acties uit te voeren. Daarbij komt dat het Afghaanse leger etnisch te versplinterd, ongeoefend, slecht uitgerust en zwak geleid is, om effectieve steun te verlenen – laat staan om de taken van ISAF binnen afzienbare tijd over te nemen. 

Zijn kritiek op het Afghaanse leger wordt onderschreven door een recente evaluatie ven de International Crisis Group.

Bound to Fail –

The Inevitable Collapse of McChrystal’s Afghan War Plan


In the 11 May issue of CounterPunch, apparently based on White House and Pentagon sources, Gareth Porter, one of the most able journalists covering the Afghan debacle, reported that General McChrystal’s war plan is in the early stages of unravelling. To appreciate why this was entirely predictable, consider please, the following:…

Without being critical, I note that neither Porter nor his sources mention the role of Afghan army and police forces in the unravelling of McChrystal’s plan. Porter is certainly aware of these limitations, having written several important reports on this subject. Nevertheless, the implication of the Taliban re-infiltration of the Marjah region is clear: the Afghan security forces in the region are either insufficient or ineffective (or both) to perform their job of protecting the people by permanently cleansing the area of Taliban…

This hydra of emerging pressures, which is probably just beginning to be appreciated, is probably why the looming offensive to secure Qandahar that McChrystal was broadcasting in April is now being scaled back in its aims.

Later this summer, as these problems become more apparent and American mid-term elections loom, we can expect to be subjected to a unseemly spectacle finger pointing and a search for scapegoats. In the end, the debacle will be fault of Obama and by extension the Democrat’s, because the President ignored Sun Tzu’s timeless wisdom, when he approved McChrystal’s fatally flawed plan, despite the cabled warnings of retired Army general Karl Eikenberry, his ambassador to Afghanistan.

The Afghan National Army: A Force in Fragments

Although the Afghan National Army could help stabilise the country, many challenges remain, including lack of leadership, low literacy, and poor logistics capabilities.

A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army , the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines the development of the Afghan national defence forces. The report assesses the corrosive effects of an arcane military bureaucracy, of ethnic factionalism and of corruption, and identifies measures to improve cohesion through legislative initiatives and the empowerment of government institutions…

Since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, the Afghan National Army (ANA) has developed its operational capacity and increased its numbers under the international community’s direction. The Afghan military has been promoted as the cornerstone of counterinsurgency in the country. Yet, there appears to be little agreement between the government of President Hamid Karzai and its international backers on what kind of army the country needs and how to build it. Ethnic frictions and political factionalism among high-level players in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the general staff have also stunted the army’s growth. As a result, the army is a fragmented force, serving disparate interests, and far from attaining the unified national character needed to confront numerous security threats.

Failure to develop a sustainable, comprehensive long-term defence posture could risk the army’s disintegration after the withdrawal of international forces. The Afghan government as a whole must assume a more prominent role in shaping its defence doctrine and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of its armed forces, so that they are no longer perceived as serving NATO first and Afghanistan second…

Afghanistan/ISAF blogs


2 thoughts on “Loopt de Amerikaanse pacificatie strategie in Afghanistan stuk?

  1. Daarmee wordt alleen maar bewezen wat krijgshistorici al lang weten:
    a) een moderne oorlog valt niet te winnen
    b) een guerillaoorlog valt alleen te verliezen
    Elke leider die dus een van de twee begint is dus volslagen krankzinnig en maakt zich automatisch schuldig aan misdaden tegen de menselijkheid.

  2. Pacificatiestrategie? Welke oen heeft dat bedacht? Dat er een strategie is is duidelijk, maar niet die van pacificatie.
    Wattman, heb jij het nu ook al over misdaden tegen de menselijkheid. Wat mij betreft is dat een miskleun. Misdaden tegen de mensheid dekt mi meer de lading.

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