Israel zou zelfstandig Iraanse nucleaire installaties kunnen aanvallen, maar de militaire en politieke risico’s daarbij resp. daarvan, zijn groot. Dat is, samengevat, de conclusie van deze studie uitgevoerd bij de Amerikaanse denktank Center for Strategic and International Studies
De conclusies en aanbevelingen hieronder weergegeven, zijn op zich al leerzaam voor hen die zich op enigerlei wijze verdiepen in dit, helaas actueel, onderwerp.
Abdullah Toucan, a senior Associate of the Burke Chair, has prepared an additional report which provides an independent assessment of Israels options for striking at Irans facilities, based in part on prior work on Irans nuclear facilities. This report provides a detailed analysis of Israeli capabilities, possible flight paths, sorties requirements, battle damage capabilities relative to target hardening, and the other details of possible Israeli strikes.
It is entitled Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Irans Nuclear Development Facilities, and is available on the CSIS web site at:
The analysis examines the problems that Israel might encounter in penetrating the air defenses of given states in the region and the comparative air defense coverage of key states along possible flight paths. Detailed maps and charts analyze the coverage of given systems, sortie options, and the other military details that shape possible Israeli and Iranian options.
Finally the analysis provides a comparative analysis of Israels possible nuclear weapons holdings relative to Irans capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, and of possible missile as well as air attacks.
The key conclusions of the analysis are:
A military strike by Israel against Iranian Nuclear Facilities is possible and the optimum route would be along the Syrian-Turkish border then over a small portion of Iraq then into Iran, and back the same route. However, the number of aircraft required, refueling along the way and getting to the targets without being detected or intercepted would be complex and high risk and would lack any assurances that the overall mission will have a high success rate.
With regard to the Arab States, most probably they will not condone any attack on Iran under the pretext that Iran poses an existential threat to Israel and a security threat to the whole region, whilst Israel has some 200 to 300 nuclear weapons, and the delivery means using the Jericho missiles, in addition to Israel still occupying the West Bank and the Syrian Golan Heights.
The more there is an Israeli threat to the survival of the regime in Iran, the more Iran will be determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran would withdraw from the NPT based on the argument that it needs to acquire nuclear weapons to protect its sovereignty and any further aggression by Israel and the U.S.
A strike by Israel on Iran will give rise to regional instability and conflict as well as terrorism.
Iran should be engaged directly by the U.S. with an agenda open to all areas of military and non-military issues that both are in agreement or disagreement. Any realistic resolution to the Iranian nuclear program will require an approach that encompasses Military, Economic, Political interests and differences of the U.S vs Iran.
The U.S. will have to try to make Comprehensive Verification of Irans Nuclear Development Program one of the priorities in any diplomatic dialogue, while trying at the same time to persuade Iran to stop its enrichment program. However, in this area the U.S. will have to walk and negotiate along a very fine line between Israels WMD and Ballistic Missile capabilities and the Iranian Nuclear development program. The U.S. must recognize that both are very closely inter-related and are fueling each other. So the U.S. should be prepared to address both issues simultaneously while trying not to be perceived as though it has double standards when it comes to Israel.